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Abstract 
The flypaper effect is the empirical anomaly by which intergovernmental grants tend to be transformed by 
recipient authorities into public expenditures at a considerably higher rate than local private resources. The 
objective of this research is to detect the existence and investigate the causes of the flypaper effect in the 
Brazilian states. Panel data evidence from 27 Brazilian states from 1985 to 2010 indicates the existence of a 
large flypaper effect, with an estimated impact of grants on public expenditures. Considering there are some 
ways to calculate MCF proxies, first, an autonomous index was used as a proxy of the marginal cost of public 
funds (MCF), because it represents how much the municipality can survive by itself, representing the 
municipalities‟ independency to federal grants. Second, the MCF was calculated by the derivation of Proper Tax 
Revenue to the Total Revenues. The results show that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending 
increases with the MCF in both proxies, but it was stronger in the autonomous index proxy, in convergence to 
results of ‎[5] to Canadian provincial data. 
Keywords: Brazilian states; marginal cost of fund; grants; flypaper effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The present study aims to analyze the Brazilian states and to test the hypothesis that the stimulative effects of 
intergovernmental grants increase with the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) of the recipient government, 
based on the research of ‎[5] using Canadian provincial data. Tax autonomous was used as a proxy of the MCF, 
considering the rate of proper taxes in relation to the total revenues of the state‎[5] found stimulative effects of 
lump-sum grants on spending increase with the provincial government‟s MCF. There are many unconditional 
and nonmatching grants in Brazil: the State Participation Fund (FPE), the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM) 
and percentages of the Rural Property Tax (ITR), the Financial Transactions Tax (IOF), the Tax on Circulation 
of Goods and Services (ICMS), the Motor Vehicle Tax (IPVA) and the Federal Value-Added Tax or Excise Tax 
on Manufactured Goods (IPI). However, the present study uses only the FPE as a proxy to unconditional and 
nonmatching grants (lump sum). Even though the large literature about flypaper effect in Brazil 
(‎[23], ‎[31], ‎[24]), there is still no conclusive evidence on the size of the flypaper effect in this country, neither a 
study considering the MCF. There is an association of distortionary taxes with the flypaper effect, considering 
transfers has a “price effect”, as well as an “income effect”, allowing the recipient government to reduce the tax 
rate and, consequently, lowering its marginal cost of public funds, maintaining the public service level ‎[6]. 
Hence, the reduction of the effective price is the cause of boosting spending. By this way, receiving grants 
causes much larger effect on spending than an increase in personal income ‎[5].  Therefore, the objective of the 
present paper is to analyse the existence of flypaper effect on the 27 Brazilian states by panel data from 1985 to 
2010. Further, two ways to deal with Marginal Cost of Funds were developed to address the importance of it in 
the transfers within Brazil federalism. The first one was based on an autonomous index, which is how much 
autonomous with proper taxes are the states faced to all the taxes and grants they receive from the federal level. 
The second one is based on the residuals of proper revenues and total revenues as an equation. About this last 
one ‎[5] did a similar analysis of the Canadian  Moreover, other ways were done in the same topic ‎[22] employed 
an empirical methodology that is very similar to ‎[5] and identified that block grants have stimulative effects on 
provincial education expenditure. This work is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the state of the art of 
the evidence on the flypaper effect at the international and national level and presents Brazil‟s institutional and 
fiscal structure details. Section 3 describes the methodology, while Section 4 reports and discusses the 
estimation results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Reference 
Reference ‎[10] did an extent analysis of the empirical fiscal illusion studies and one of the forms is called 
flypaper effect. The flypaper effect has been largely studied (‎[39], ‎[58]) and is treated as an anomaly because it 
is inconsistent with the “equivalence theorem” ‎[19]. The “flypaper effect” happens when an unconditional lump-
sum grant to a local government increases spending in a greater proportion than an equivalent raise in local 
income (‎[39], ‎[52]). The phenomenon was first named by Arthur Okun, because the money the government 
sends out “sticks where it hits”‎[22], for example, investigated the effects of block grants on education 
expenditures using panel data from Canadian provinces over the period 1982 to 2008 and found out that block 
grants have stimulative effects on provincial education expenditure. A one dollar increase in per capita federal 
grants was associated with an increase in per capita education expenditure of about Can$0.21, disclosuring the 
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flypaper effect in Canada. There are evidence of flypaper effect all over the world: Reference ‎[66] – Turkey, 
Reference ‎[33] – South Africa, Reference ‎[46] – Denmark, Reference ‎[63] – German, Reference ‎[29] – Spain, 
Reference ‎[17] – Spain, Reference ‎[61] – Kenya, Reference ‎[51] – Mexico, Reference ‎[12] – US, Reference ‎[42] 
– US, Reference ‎[15] – US, Reference ‎[57] – US, Reference ‎[56] – US, Reference ‎[62] – US, Reference ‎[34] – 
Indonesia, Reference ‎[18] – England and Germany, Reference ‎[2] – US, Reference ‎[64] – Canada, 
Reference ‎[44] – Brazil, Reference ‎[8], ‎[9] – Australia). Also in private sector firms: Reference ‎[40] – US firms, 
Reference ‎[32] – Peru and ‎[43] – Spain. In the South America, Reference ‎[52] shows new estimates in the 
presence of spatial dependence, when local spending is not independent from its neighbor jurisdictions‟ 
behavior. By Argentinean county-level data (Buenos Aires), the study showed that while the “flypaper effect 
still holds true in the presence of spillover effects or mimic behavior across jurisdictions, it could be 
overestimated in the presence of spatial interdependence. In Brazil, there are also many studies about 
flypaper ‎[28] identified stronger flypaper effect in municipalities with larger geographic areas. It is consistent 
with a budget-maximizing bureaucracy explanation of the flypaper effect, considering larger municipalities‟ 
residents wouldn‟t easily move to municipalities that might spend less on public services and offer lower 
taxes ‎[60] searched a panel of Brazilian municipalities from 1989 and 2005 and found out that grants have an 
asymmetric impact on public expenditure and this effect generates a recomposition between current expenses 
and investments. Moreover, the results indicate that municipal public spending is more sensitive to increases in 
government transfers than increases in local income, which means flypaper effect ‎[13] searched Argentinean 
provinces and Brazilian states and identified the presence of flypaper effect ‎[45] searched 476 Brazilian 
municipalities from 2005 to 2012 and concluded that the flypaper effect exists in Brazilian municipalities and is 
intensified by the alignment of the representatives. Additionally, evidences of higher flypaper effect were found 
in municipalities with low tax autonomy ‎[16] provides an explanation for the flypaper effect which is simply 
because public expenditures are cheaper when financed with intergovernmental transfers. A lump-sum increase 
in income can lead to three effects on optimal government decisions. The first one is the net substitution effect, 
which represents a change in public expenditures due to the induced change in the tax base and the MCF. The 
second is the private-income affect, a change in public expenditures due to greater taxpayers‟ income. The last is 
the public-income effect, a change in public expenditures due to additional public funds available to purchase 
public goods. Considering intergovernmental transfers do not directly alter taxpayer‟s decisions about the tax 
base, they lead only to a public-income effect. Brazil is a continental country, composed by the Union, 26 states, 
the Federal District and 5570 municipalities. Regarding to transfers, the Federal Government distributes 
resources to the states and the municipalities, while the states also distribute resources to the municipalities, with 
an active competence to collect certain taxes. It is a simple system ‎[53], although the outcomes are complex to 
analyze effectiveness, as well as to verify the existence and respective reasons of occurrence of the flypaper 
effect. There are several types of transfers in Brazil, matching and non-matching. The flypaper is verified only 
when it results from non-matching grants, for instance the Municipal Participation Fund ‎[25]. Non-matching 
grants could be susceptible to resource allocation maneuvers, mainly due to electoral alignment (‎[3], ‎[47], ‎[54]), 
but as the formula is fixed, based on population and per capita income, this weakness should be minimized. 
2.1. MCF 
It is important to analyze the MCF in the context of the flypaper because its isolated study can lead to erroneous 
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conclusions. Several authors did this analysis by robust studies (‎[49], ‎[50],‎[41],‎[65],‎[5]). Some author‟s 
explanations of the flypaper effect are directly or indirectly based on the MCF (‎[38], ‎[6],‎[32]). 
Initially, the concept of marginal cost of fund (MCF) is broadly described by ‎[7]. In summary, it measures the 
loss incurred by society in raising additional revenues to finance government spending. The flypaper effect can 
be obtained when the MCF is greater than one and non-decreasing in the tax rate ‎[16]. There are many ways to 
calculate MCF ‎[7]. However, many estimates are not comparable, because there are many definitions of the 
same concept ‎[21] and those who review theoretically the works show the diversity of estimates (‎[14], ‎[7]). 
Some MCF‟s works are shown below: 
Table 1: Previous Studies 
Author MCF Proxy 
Reference‎[38] Intergovernmental transfers can stimulate public expenditures more than income increases 
because they normally lead to a greater reduction in the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). 
Reference ‎[6] Grants can reduce the cost of taxation for local governments through a change in the MCF. 
Lump-sum grants allow the recipient government to reduce its tax rate, which in turn, decreases 
the MCF in order to keep the same level of public service. 
Reference‎[21] MCF = -ΔW/ ΔR, where ΔW is a monetary measure of the change in social welfare and ΔR is 
the change in tax revenue arising from a marginal change in a tax instrument. The estimated 
MCF in Africa is 1.21. 
Reference‎[32] The flypaper effect is obtained when the marginal (administrative) cost of tax collections 
increases with the tax rate. 
Reference‎[13] For Argentinean provinces and Brazilian states, there is a positive association between the size 
of the flypaper effect and the level of the tax rate. Moreover, the flypaper effect should be 
larger the lower the elasticity of substitution between private and public spending and, in fact, 
should vanish for very high degrees of substitution. 
Reference ‎[5] MCFit = Sit/(Sit+τit.η), where Sit is the share of total tax revenue from personal income tax base 
for province i in year t, τit is the personal income tax rate for province i in year t and η is the 
uniquely estimated semi-elasticity of the personal income tax base with respect to personal 
income tax rate.  
Reference‎[16] Fypaper effect can be explained as an optimal decision of a benevolent and efficient 
government constrained by taxpayers‟ responses to taxation. The MCF does not need to change 
with transfers to produce the flypaper effect. It can be constant but needs to be greater than one. 
The simple underlying explanation for the flypaper effect is that public expenditures are 
cheaper when financed with transfers than when finance with income. 
Reference‎[24] For Local Governments in Brazil, an increase in R$ 1.00 in per capita unconditional transfers 
reduces the local price effect (MCF) around 0.07%. 
According to ‎[6], benevolent local governments financing its expenditures with a distortionary tax predict 
flypaper effects, because lump-sum intergovernmental transfer has a “price effect” and an “income effect”. 
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Thus, these grants allow recipient governments to reduce its tax rate, which lowers its marginal cost of public 
funds, while can provide the same level of public service. “The reduction in the effective price of providing the 
public service helps to explain the flypaper effect” ‎[6],‎[16] supports the flypaper effect can be obtained when the 
MCF is greater than one and non-decreasing in the tax rate. The reason is because an amount of income is lost 
before being made available to the government, while the same amount of transfers is readily available without 
costs. Hence, the flypaper effect does not require the MCF to be increasing in the tax rate (‎[38], ‎[6], ‎[5]). 
Besides, the flypaper effect can be obtained with a constant greater than one MCF ‎[5] tested the hypothesis that 
the stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants increase with the marginal cost of public funds of the 
recipient government in Canadian provinces. The results indicate that the stimulative effects of lump-sum grants 
on spending increase with the provincial government‟s marginal cost of public funds (MCF). Reference ‎[24] 
document empirical evidence on price-effect caused by lump sum grants for Brazilian municipalities from 2006 
to 2010 and found out that an increase in R$ 1.00 in per capita unconditional transfers reduces the local price 
effect (MCF) around 0.07%. Considering the MCF is often calculated by the tax rate, in Brazil is very difficult 
to take a single tax rate or the median of them, because there are many types of taxes and many tax rates. To 
exemplify, ‎[45] show the States Participation Fund (FPE), which is a percentage of 48% of the total of two 
Federal taxes: Income tax (IR) and Federal value added tax or excise tax on manufactured goods (IPI). 
Moreover, the states receive four more grants from Federal level (Residual taxes, Financial transactions tax 
(IOF), Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain on fuels (CIDE) and Federal value-added tax or 
excise tax on manufactured goods on exportation (IPI-Exp)).  Each of these taxes has different tax rates, 
considering the particular situations, the taxpayer conditions and particular exceptions ‎[11]. For example, 
companies can pay 15% or 25% of Income tax (IR), depending on how much is the year earnings. The 
employees can pay four tax rates (7,5%, 15%, 22,5% and 27,5%), depending on the tax base of each employee. 
Thereupon, it‟s hard to stablish a tax rate to a Brazilian state, for example. Furthermore, the percentages of FPE 
the states receive are defined every year by the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), based on Population size and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 
Table 2: FPE Percentages 
n State FPE Coefficient (%) n State FPE Coefficient (%) 
1 Acre 3.4210 15 Paraíba 4.7889 
2 Alagoas 4.1601 16 Paraná 2.8832 
3 Amapá 3.4120 17 Pernambuco 6.9002 
4 Amazonas 2.7904 18 Piauí 4.3214 
5 Bahia 9.3962 19 Rio de Janeiro 1.5277 
6 Ceará 7.3369 20 Rio Grande do Norte 4.1779 
7 Distrito Federal 0.6902 21 Rio Grande do Sul 2.3548 
8 Espírito Santo 1.5000 22 Rondônia 2.8156 
9 Goiás 2.8431 23 Roraima 2.4807 
10 Maranhão 7.2182 24 Santa Catarina 1.2798 
11 Mato Grosso 2.3079 25 São Paulo 1.0000 
12 Mato Grosso do Sul 1.3320 26 Sergipe 4.1553 
13 Minas Gerais 4.4545 27 Tocantins 4.3400 
14 Pará 6.1120 Total 100 
Considering this situation and the difficulty of building a MCF proxy, it‟s possible to calculate the amount each 
state receive from grants and how much do they earn by local taxes. The result (called by us as Autonomous 
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Index) fits as a MCF proxy, because it represents exactly how much autonomous is the state in relation to the 
Federal level. It shows how much the municipality can survive only by itself, taxing and earning funds by its 
own. Thus, it‟s one of the ways to know the municipality‟s independency. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The sample consists of a panel of 27 states from 1985 to 2010. An additional analysis was done excluding the 
Federal District, because it represents a hybrid entity accumulating state and municipality functions. Current 
expenditure and grants data were obtained from Finbra's Finance System, while GDP and population data were 
obtained from the IBGE database. The monetary variables were deflated  The period from 1985 to 2010 was 
tested because all the variables were available, including the controls variables. However there are some 
available data until 2016, it was preferable to use the data from 1985 to 2010 because all the controls were 
available, which is more reliable and stable considering the deflated applied to the data. There are some 
similarities between Argentina and Brazil, because while Argentina is divided into 23 states or provinces and a 
Federal District (Buenos Aires City) and the province of Buenos Aires accounts for one third of total population 
and half of the GDP of the country ‎[52]. While Brazil has 26 states and a Federal District and it accounts for 
1.43% of total population ‎[35] and 3.8% of the GDP of the country ‎[36]. 
3.2. Variables 
Several previous works have studied the determinants of local public expenditures ‎[5]. We use here current 
expenditure as the dependent variable, and state GDP as a proxy for the private income variable. The 
nonmatching and unconditional (lump sum) grant that we use is the federal grants State Participation Fund 
(FPE). Therefore, some authors have used grant proxies with more components as ‎[27], ‎[48] and in general 
other studies consider FPM, IOF, ICMS and IPVA ‎[27]. The grants FPE is unconditional and nonmatching 
(lump sum) grant. 
3.3. Controls 
The following variables were used as controls in the expenditure determination equation: Gini index, Theil 
index, citizen‟s income, water bodies and illiteracy rate. Initially, we performed a detailed analysis of the 
classification of nonmatching unconditional (lump sum) grants in Brazil and considered only grants in 
congruence to the theory of flypaper effect, with is the FPE. There are evidences that states with political 
alignment receive more grants and have greater effect flypaper ‎[59], however, it was not done in the state level. 
The database is from 1985 to 2010 because the control variables are available only until 2010 (gender, youth, 
elderly), since they are frequently discontinued in Brazil and this was the longest observable time series of these 
variables. The data availability of these control variables was questioned in the Federal Government 
Transparency Portal, but it was informed the data and research were actually discontinued and there is no 
prospect of further updates. Another limitation refers to state GDP data, which are available only two years after 
the end of the year it refers to ‎[35]. 
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3.4. Econometric Model 
An index of tax autonomy was used to test if financial constraints can be responsible for the flypaper effect. 
This index represents how much autonomous the states are in collecting their own taxes 
(‎[37], ‎[49], ‎[50], ‎[41], ‎[67], ‎[5]). This index is represented bellow: 
MCFit = Proper Tax Revenueit / Total Revenueit               (1) 
where Proper Tax Revenueit represents the sum of the Current Tax Revenues and Contributions Revenues items, 
which includes all the five taxes that the STF stated, which are: taxes, fees, improvement contribution, 
compulsory loan and contributions in general. Total Revenueit is the sum of Current Revenues and Investment 
Revenues. 
After calculating the index, equation (2) was estimated including an interaction between MCF and Grants: 
Expit = β0 + β1Grantit + β2MCFit + β3MCFit*Grantit + β4GDPit + β5Controlsit +ϵit                (2) 
where Expit is the current expenditure of the state i in the year t, Grantit is the nonmatching and unconditional 
(lump sum) transfers of the state i in the year t. In the present study, Grantit is the federal transfer to the states 
called FPE, considering it is constitutional and clearly exogenous as the federal transfer to the states, according 
to ‎[27]; GDPit is the Gross Domestic Product of the state i in the year t, and Controlsit are Gini index, Theil 
index, citizen‟s income, water bodies and illiteracy rate; and ϵit is the residuals (i = 27 states and t = 1985 to 
2010). The model allows the stimulative effects of grants on government spending to depend on the MCFit. The 
most important coefficient is β3, because it represents if the stimulative effect of grants on public spending 
increases with the MCF as predicted by ‎[5], we expect β3 > 0. The expected result is a positive and significant 
coefficient of the interaction variable between MCF and Grant (β3) ‎[5]. Also the monetary variables (Expit, 
GDPit and Grantit) were considered as per capita, deflated by the General Market Price Index – Internal 
Availability (IGP-DI), as with the previous analysis (‎[27], ‎[48], ‎[45], ‎[24]). The data have a small cross-section 
(27 states), but a large time series of 26 years. Some tests do not make sense in short panels (‎[20], ‎[30]) as 
cointegration, normality (‎[55]), serial correlation ‎[1] and multicolinearity ‎[4]. In consequence, they were not 
done in the present study. Regarding to collinearity, Reference ‎[26] warned that ICMS state grant in their model 
may have generated collinearity, since its collection is determined by the state GDP. However, they argued that 
the importance of this type of transference is low in relation to the total grants. Another problem can be the high 
correlation between expenditure, GDP and grant variables. Future studies can deepen the theme and verify the 
interrelationship between these variables. Finally, with regard to heterosckedasticity, it was not even possible to 
calculate according to the extent of the panel. Therefore, the econometric assumptions were followed and 
adopted based on the previous literature and according to the panel length. According to ‎[24], there is another 
way to calculate the MCF, which is presented in the following model: 
MCF_dit = ∂(Proper Tax Revenueit) / ∂(Total Revenueit)               (3) 
which is similar to the eq. 1, but the new MCF_dit is calculated by the derivation of Proper Tax Revenueit to the 
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Total Revenueit. Thus, the residuals ϵit of the equation below are considered the new MCF_dit: 
Proper Tax Revenueit = β1 + β2Total Revenue_dit + +ϵit                (4) 
after calculating the MCF_dit, equation (5) was estimated, which includes interactions of MCF_dit and Grantit, 
similar to equation (2): 
Expit = β0 + β1Grantit + β2MCFit + β3MCF_d*Grantit + β4GDPit + β5Controlsit +ϵit               (5) 
considering the different forms to calculate the MCF ‎[7], this procedure helps to guarantee the robustness of the 
study. 
4. Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model, with tests of difference between means of the state 
aligned and unaligned by coalition or party, are shown in table 3: 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics – Aligned versus Unaligned States 
Variables Without Federal District    With Federal District  
 
Mean Avg Std.Dv Smalle
st 
Larges
t 
O
bs 
 Mean Avg Std.Dv Smalle
st 
Larges
t 
O
bs 
Exp 
1.491 1.593 .802 0 5.828 69
8 
 1.536 1.752 1.213 0 11.740 67
2 
GDP 
9.855 11.560 5.490 3.788 30.243 70
2 
 10.150 12.939 8.869 3.788 58.489 67
2 
Grant 
.269 .496 .651 0 4.781 69
8 
 .260 .483 .643 0 4.781 67
2 
MCF 
.461 .447 .209 0 .907 69
7 
 .458 .445 .210 0 .907 67
1 
MCF*Grant 
.117 .144 .126 0 .679 69
7 
 .108 .141 .125 0 .679 67
1 
MCF_d 
-
25.640 
-
2.86e+
09 
9.25e+
09 
-
3.66e+
09 
9.98e+
10 
69
9 
 22.864 -
2.81e+
09 
9.09e+
09 
-
3.95e+
09 
9.98e+
10 
67
3 
MCF_d 
*Grant 
-
1.11e+
09 
-
4.90e+
08 
2.27e+
09 
-
1.59e+
10 
9.85e+
09 
69
6 
 -
1.06e+
09 
-
4.58e+
08 
2.22e+
09 
-
1.58e+
10 
9.85e+
09 
67
0 
Controls              
Gini 
.556 .552 .065 0 .666 70
1 
 .559 .554 .065 0 .666 67
5 
Theil 
.636 .647 .150 0 1.313 70
1 
 .643 .649 .148 0 1.313 67
5 
Citizen‟s 
income 
618.40 648.64 260.94 0 1503.3
2 
70
1 
 630.45 679.16 306.20
9 
0 2279.6
9 
67
5 
Water  
.802 .753 .204 0 .997 70
1 
 .815 .761 .204 0 .997 67
5 
Illiteracy 
.133 .165 .104 0 .505 70
2 
 .130 .161 .104 0 .505 67
6 
Source: authors. All monetary variables are per capita and deflated to 2010 by the General Market Price Index – 
Internal Availability (IGP-DI). The results show the Federal District contributes to higher the mean and average 
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of the monetary variables, mainly because it accumulates state and municipality functions. It‟s also possible to 
observe that the Gini index increases when the Federal District is added to the sample, indicating the inequality 
increasing, which is true, because the Federal District has higher Gini index. The results of eq. 2 are presented 
by the table below: 
Table 4: Identified flypaper effect constitutional grants (robust) with MCF 
 Without Federal District With Federal District 
Variables/Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Grant 
0.447 
(.038)*** 
.126 
(.071)* 
.153 
(.066) 
.552 
(.059)*** 
.176 
(.103)* 
.153 
(.104) 
MCF 
 
-.731 
(.128)*** 
-.736 
(.120)*** 
 -1.521 
(.188)*** 
-1.582 
(.185)*** 
MCF*Grant 
 
1.096 
(.275)*** 
1.159 
(.274)*** 
 1.485 
(.413)*** 
1.354 
(.439)*** 
GDP 
0.045 
(.008)*** 
.125 
(.006)*** 
.060 
(.008)*** 
.092 
(.007)*** 
.111 
(.005)*** 
 
Gini 
2.306 
(.696)***  
1.746 
(.766)** 
2.834 
(1.152)** 
 .969 
(1.254) 
Theil 
-.922 
(.272)***  
-.726 
(.277)*** 
-1.346 
(.459)*** 
 -.779 
(.463)* 
Citizen‟s Income 
.001 
(.000)***  
.000 
(.000)*** 
.000 
(.000) 
 .000 
(.000) 
Water bodies 
-.263 
(.180)  
-.510 
(.195)*** 
-.296 
(.281) 
 -.287 
(.301) 
Illiteracy 
-1.663 
(.432)***  
-2.012 
(.443)*** 
-1.361 
(.683)** 
 -1.651 
(.680)** 
       
Dummy Years No No No No No No 
States fixed effect No No No No No No 
Year fixed effect No No No No No No 
Obs 672 672 672 698 698 698 
States 26 26 26 27 27 27 
R² 0.748 0.551 0.751 0.886 0.926 0.930 
Wald chi2(7) 785.28***   503.08***   
Wald chi2(4)  561.64***   516.45***  
Wald chi2(9)   817.66***   611.56*** 
Source: authors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N = from 1985 to 2010. ***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .1. 
In the same way of ‎[5], the results show the stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with the 
MCF and β3 > 0 is positive and significant in all the models the MCF variables are included (2, 3, 5, 6), as 
expected initially. Hence, it can be concluded that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases 
with the MCF. The above results of β1 > 0 do not indicate the effects of grants on government expenditures due 
to the presence of the interaction term. Related to eq. 5, to verify another way of estimating the MCF, the results 
are presented below: 
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Table 5: Identified flypaper effect constitutional grants (robust) with MCF_d 
 Without Federal District With Federal District 
Variables/Models (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Grant 
.816 
(.079)*** 
.726 
(.087)*** 
.831 
(.121)*** 
.845 
(.147)*** 
MCF_d 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-0.000 
(.000) 
-0,000 
(.000) 
MCF_d*Grant 
.000 
(.000)*** 
.000 
(.000)*** 
0.000 
(.000)** 
0.000 
(.000)* 
GDP 
.093 
(.007)*** 
.046 
(.008)*** 
.099 
(.005)*** 
.096 
(.007)*** 
Gini 
 
2.803 
(.708)*** 
 3.307 
(1.195)*** 
Theil 
 
-.937 
(.269)*** 
 -1.366 
(.463)*** 
Citizen‟s Income 
 
.000 
(.000)*** 
 -.000 
(.000) 
Water bodies 
 
-.434 
(.196)** 
 -.308 
(.301) 
Illiteracy 
 
-1.876 
(.442)*** 
 -1.463 
(.693)** 
     
Dummy Years No No No No 
States fixed effect No No No No 
Year fixed effect No No No No 
Obs 670 670 696 696 
States 26 26 27 27 
R² 0.506 0.738 0.895 0.901 
Source: authors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. N = from 1985 to 2010. ***p< .01; **p< .05; *p< .1. 
The results are aligned to ‎[5], considering the results show β3 > 0 and significant in models 7 and 8, while they 
are not strongly significant in models 9 (at 5%) and 10 (at 10%). Any of the coefficients were less than 0, which 
support the results are aligned to the expectations. However, considering they were not so higher than zero, the 
results show the many ways to calculate and estimate MCF (‎[7], ‎[21]) can lead to different results. The MCF 
proxy as index of tax autonomy (eq. 1) shows results totally aligned to the results of ‎[5]. Although, the MCF 
proxy as the derivation of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total Revenues (eq. 3) disclosures results aligned to ‎[5], 
but not so strong, because the coefficient are closer to zero, and not higher than zero. Finally, it can be 
concluded that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with the MCF. 
5. Conclusions 
The research about flypaper effect highlights the empirical anomaly that intergovernmental grants tend to be 
transformed by recipient authorities into public expenditures at a considerably higher rate than local private 
resources. The marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is one of the reasons flypaper effect exists, as many authors 
found relation between them ‎[5], for instance, show that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending 
increases with the MCF.  The objective of this research is to detect the existence and investigate the causes of 
the flypaper effect in the Brazilian states, by two proxies of MCF. The first is an autonomous index used as a 
proxy of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), because it represents how much the municipality can survive 
by itself, representing the municipalities‟ independency to federal grants. Second, the MCF was calculated by 
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the derivation of Proper Tax Revenue to the Total Revenues. Panel data evidence from 27 Brazilian states 
between 1985 and 2010 indicates the existence of a large flypaper effect, with an estimated impact of grants on 
public expenditures. The results evidence that the stimulative effect of grants on public spending increases with 
the MCF in both proxies, but it was stronger in the autonomous index proxy, in convergence to results of ‎[5] to 
Canadian provincial data. Future studies can test other proxies of MCF or other relations related to the flypaper 
effect and fiscal illusion. There are many ways to estimate the MCF, which highlight the need of studying the 
actual meaning and faithful of them. As there are many ways and also many models to consider MCF as a 
reason to the flypaper effect, other variables need to be considered, as population, social-economic 
characteristics, geographical considerations, as functions of the local governments to the community and to the 
whole country. Political aspects can also be considered, especially in Brazil, where the number of politicians is 
high and the electoral system is complex, because the way to calculate the votes is based not only on the number 
of votes the candidate owns, but also the votes its party win. Moreover, the grants from the federal level to state 
level is complex because it considers many kinds of taxes, as explained by ‎[45]. Finally, the future researchers 
can deeper this analysis in the context of the flypaper effect. 
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6. Appendix 
IGP-DI Index 
Table 6 
 
year Deflation Index 
1985  3,417,402,846.02  
1986  1,194,970,774.62  
1987     409,207,452.50  
1988       62,191,009.50  
1989         3,964,141.28  
1990           157,532.03  
1991             36,403.64  
1992               3,892.72  
1993                  162.96  
1994                     7.23  
1995                     3.63  
1996                     3.06  
1997                     2.65  
1998                     2.43  
1999                     2.28  
2000                     2.14  
2001                     2.03  
2002                     1.85  
2003                     1.56  
2004                     1.48  
2005                     1.35  
2006                     1.37  
2007                     1.26  
2008                     1.09  
2009                     1.03  
2010                     1.00  
 
